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Commercial Transportation
by Madeline E. McNeeley *
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Joshua H. Dorminy ***
Elizabeth M. Brooks ****
and Stephen G. Lowry *****
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial transportation involves all the significant forms of
passenger and freight transportation across the United States. This
Article surveys significant judicial, regulatory, and legislative
developments in commercial-transportation law affecting the federal
judicial circuit including Georgia, Alabama, and Florida during the
period from January 1, 2020, through December 31, 2020.1 The first three
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areas discussed here are subject to heavy federal regulation due to their
far-reaching effects on interstate commerce: trucking and other
commercial motor vehicles, aviation, and railroads. The other two areas
discussed in this Article—autonomous-vehicle technology and shareable
electric bicycles and scooters—are regulated primarily at the state and
local levels at present but interact with federal law in some important
ways.
II. TRUCKING AND OTHER COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES
A. Regulation
In May of 2020, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) issued a long-awaited hours of service final rule.2 The final rule
includes major changes that Transportation Secretary, Elaine Chao, said
would give commercial drivers more control and options for planning
their days.3 In effect, the new rule allows commercial truck drivers to
travel longer distances, for a longer period of time, and to still be
considered a “short haul” driver, therefore not subject to the strict
requirements of the FMCSA.4 The rule change extends the distance limit
for short haul drivers from 100 air miles to 150 air miles and increases
short haul drivers’ maximum on-duty period from twelve to fourteen
hours.5 The new rules also give drivers more options for how they split
their sleeping and driving hours and required thirty-minute breaks after
eight hours of driving.6 Drivers will now be able to split their required
ten hours off-duty into two periods: one period of at least seven
consecutive hours in the sleeper berth and the other period of not less
than two consecutive hours, either off-duty or in the sleeper berth.7 The
final rule does not increase driving time and will continue to prevent
commercial truck drivers from driving for more than eight consecutive
hours without at least a thirty-minute break.8

49 C.F.R. §§ 385, 395 (2021).
Eric Miller and Eleanor Lamb, FMCSA Unveils Proposed Changes to Hours-of-Service
Rules,
Transport
Topics
(last
accessed
July
17,
2020),
https://www.ttnews.com/articles/fmcsa-unveils-hos.
4 Final Rule, Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., Docket No. FMCSA-2018-0248 (2020).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
2
3
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B. Recent Cases
In Hardman v. Southeast Permanente Medical Group, Inc.,9 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
addressed the question of whether a doctor, who certified a motor carrier
driver as fit to drive, could be held liable to the victim of the driver
following a trucking accident. In Hardman, the plaintiff’s wife died after
her vehicle was rear-ended by a tractor-trailer in Alabama. The driver of
the tractor-trailer, Mr. Hawkins, owned his own trucking company,
Hawkins Brothers, LLC. Prior to the collision, which occurred in 2016,
the driver had been diagnosed with Type II diabetes mellitus in 2001 and
began taking insulin in 2010.10 Under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSR),11 a driver diagnosed with Type II diabetes must
receive an exemption in order to continue operating as a commercial
truck driver.12 To receive the exemption, the driver must “obtain medical
certification from a physician listed on the FMCSAs National Registry of
Certified Medical Examiners.”13 Mr. Hawkins did obtain a medical
certificate, but the physician who completed Mr. Hawkins’s medical
certificate was not registered with the FMCSA. The plaintiff filed suit
against the physician’s medical practice and the physician alleging
claims for negligence, wantonness, and negligent supervision.14
The crux of the plaintiff’s case was that the physician who signed Mr.
Hawkins’s certificate was negligent in certifying him as fit to operate a
commercial motor vehicle and that the plaintiff’s wife was killed as result
of that negligence.15 Specifically, the plaintiff’s expert contended there
was evidence to suggest that Mr. Hawkins fell asleep at the wheel,
causing the collision at issue.16 The defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that as to the claim of negligence, Mr.
Hawkins’s physician owed no duty to the plaintiff’s wife, a third party.17
The court, applying Alabama law, disagreed.18 Rather, the court

2020 WL 6135655 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
Id. at *1.
11 49 C.F.R. §§ 300–399 (2021).
12 49 C.F.R. § 391.46.
13 2020 WL 6135655, at *1.
14 Id. at *2.
15 Id.
16 There was also evidence that following the wreck, Mr. Hawkins sought treatment for
and was diagnosed with severe sleep apnea by another physician. Id. at *5.
17 Id. at *7.
18 Id. (“However, for an injury to be foreseeable under Alabama law, ‘it is not necessary
to anticipate the specific [harm] that occurred, but only that some general harm or
9

10
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reasoned that “the existence of a duty is determined by a number of
factors, including, ‘(1) the nature of the defendant's activity; (2) the
relationship between the parties; and (3) the type of injury or harm
threatened[,]’” and especially “whether the injury was foreseeable by the
defendant.”19 The court found under the facts of the case and
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff . . . that it was reasonably
foreseeable that an automobile accident would follow Dr. Simpson's
certification of Mr. Hawkins as medically fit to drive a commercial
motor vehicle in the event Mr. Hawkins was not actually fit to operate
such a vehicle—due to, for example, untreated and undiagnosed sleep
apnea.20

Thus, even though the person harmed was not the physician’s patient,
it was foreseeable that untreated conditions such as those experienced
by Mr. Hawkins could cause an automobile accident and injure another
motorist, so the physician owed a duty to her and there was a fact
question about whether he had breached that duty.21
Although the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants as to the plaintiff’s claims for wantonness and negligent
supervision, the court’s finding opens the door to potential liability for
those in the medical field who are responsible for ensuring the physical
fitness of drivers.
III. AVIATION
Commercial aviation is almost exclusively controlled by federal
authority through statutes, courts, and regulations promulgated by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). While the Eleventh Circuit did
publish a noteworthy opinion regarding the viability of claims pursuant
to federal maritime law, this Survey period brought an unprecedented
task to rulemaking authorities: the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to
regulations issued in the ordinary course, the FAA worked swiftly to
address the role of aviation in this public health emergency. The FAA
faces a considerable challenge in having to enact regulations that balance
the interests of safety and continuing aviation operations while the
COVID-19 pandemic evolves in real time.

consequence would follow.’”) (quoting Smith v. AmSouth Bank, Inc., 892 So. 2d 905, 910
(Ala. 2004)).
19 Id. at *7.
20 Id.
21 Id. at *9.
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A. Regulation
In February 2020, the FAA amended the requirements of pilot
professional development.22 This final rule provides that new-hire pilots
must have an opportunity to observe operations and become familiar
with procedures before serving on a flight crew, revises curriculum, and
requires leadership and mentoring training to reduce incidents of
unprofessional behavior and pilot errors.23 The National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) has continuously cited pilot behavior as factors in
multiple incidents and accidents.24 This rule is an acknowledgement of
an ongoing problem in the aviation industry with pilots engaging in
unprofessional behavior and not adhering to standard operating
procedures, which has catastrophic results.25
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization characterized
COVID-19 as a pandemic, which required immediate action among
numerous industries, including aviation. The FAA issued Special Federal
Aviation Regulation No. 118 (SFAR 118),26 which extended deadlines for
certain requirements that were unable to be met because of the COVID19 pandemic.27 Many of the FAA’s training, testing, recency, and renewal
requirements require individuals to be in close proximity where there is
an increased risk of COVID-19 transmission.28 Under the extraordinary
circumstances, the FAA determined that extending the certification
requirements would not present an additional risk to aviation safety that

22 14 C.F.R. § 121.400 (2021);14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. E, F, H (2020); 14 C.F.R. pt. 121,
App. F (2020); 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. H (2020); 14 C.F.R. § 61.71 (2021); 14 C.F.R. § 91.1063
(2021); 14 C.F.R. § 135.3 (2021).
23 Pilot Professional Development, 85 Fed. Reg. 10,896 (Feb. 25, 2020).
24 On Oct. 14, 2004, Northwest Airlink flight 3701 crashed into a residential area in
Missouri, killing both pilots and destroying the plane. On Feb. 12, 2009, Continental
Connection flight 3407 crashed into a residence in New York, killing two pilots, two flight
attendants, all 45 passengers, and one person on the ground. The NTSB cited pilot error as
the cause of both crashes. Id. at 10,899.
25 Id. at 10,898–99. (The rule was amended in June 2020 and July 2020 to correct several
regulations that were improperly identified. Pilot Professional Development; Technical
Amendment, Correction, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,692 (Jul. 24, 2020)).
26 Relief for Certain Persons and Operations During the Coronavirus Disease Outbreak,
85 Fed. Reg. 26,326 (May 4, 2020) (affecting 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 61, 63, 65, 91, 107, 125 &
141).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 26,329.
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could not be mitigated.29 The FAA amended SFAR 118 three times in
2020 to expand the protections to new populations of airmen.30
Another action necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic paused legal
enforcement against any pilot, crewmember, or flight engineer based on
noncompliance with medical certificate duration standards.31 While FAA
medical examinations are critical to aviation safety,32 the physical nature
of the examinations increases the risk of transmission of COVID-19. This
relief only applied to an eligible class of persons and was limited to
medical certificates that expired between March 31, 2020 and June 30,
2020.33
The next regulatory update involves an issue known to most air
travelers. The Department of Transportation (DOT) defined “service
animal” as “a dog, regardless of breed or type, that is individually trained
to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of a qualified individual with
a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or
other mental disability.”34 Because airlines charge passengers for
transporting pets and are prohibited from charging passengers traveling
with service animals, passengers previously had an incentive to claim
their pets were “emotional support animals” and, thus, service animals.35
More passengers traveling with animals, many of which were uncrated
and untrained, resulted in an increase of animal misbehavior on
airplanes and in the airport. Now, airlines can classify emotional support
animals as pets and limit the number of service animals that one
passenger can bring onboard an aircraft.36
Under this rule, airlines can require passengers to submit a form
attesting to a service animal’s training, good behavior, and health,37 and

Id.
Limited Extension of Relief for Certain Persons and Operations During the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,763 (Jun. 25, 2020);
85 Fed. Reg. 47,295 (Aug. 5, 2020); Second Limited Extension of Relief for Certain Persons
and Operations During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed.
Reg. 62,951 (Oct. 6, 2020).
31 Enforcement Policy for Expired Airman Medical Certificates, 85 Fed. Reg. 18,110
(Apr. 1, 2020).
32 14 C.F.R. pt. 67.
33 85 Fed. Reg. at 18,111.
34 14 C.F.R. § 382.3 (2020).
35 Traveling by Air With Service Animals, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,742, 79,744 (Dec. 10, 2020);
14 C.F.R. § 382, Subpart E (2020).
36 14 C.F.R. § 382.74 (2020).
37 14 C.F.R. § 382.75 (2020).
29
30
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can require that service animals are tethered onboard an aircraft.38 The
rule also specifies the circumstances under which a passenger may be
charged for damage caused by the animal.39
The DOT did not previously regulate the transportation of animals on
aircraft, but the FAA Reauthorization Act of 201840 requires the DOT to
define “service animal” and develop standards for service and emotional
support animals.41 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) also defines
“service animal” in the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).42 At
Congress’s request, the DOT revised its previous “service animal”
definition43 to align more closely with the ADA’s definition, but the
substantive requirements of the DOT’s and DOJ’s rules for service
animals differ in several respects.44 This demonstrates the conflicts that
may arise when federal agencies have intersecting authority on an issue.
Two additional rules were enacted by the FAA in December 2020.
“Streamlined Launch and Reentry License Requirements” addresses the
FAA’s commercial space launch and reentry regulations, governs the
licensing of vehicle operators, and removes obsolete requirements.45
“Removal of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft” eliminates regulations
following a change in the law regarding unmanned aircraft systems
operating in the National Airspace System.46
B. Legislation
No significant aviation legislation was enacted in 2020, though two
bills were introduced in Congress. The “Restoring Aviation
Accountability Act of 2020” set out to require more accountability in the
airline industry.47 The “Aircraft Safety Improvement Act of 2020”
attempted to improve the FAA’s aircraft certification process.48 Both bills
were referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation but neither received a vote.
14 C.F.R. § 382.73(b) (2020).
14 C.F.R. § 382.78 (2020).
40 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–30 (2020).
41 Id.
42 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2016); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2016).
43 14 C.F.R. § 382.117 (2008).
44 85 Fed. Reg. at 79,776 (Dec. 10, 2020).
45 85 Fed. Reg. 79,566 (Dec. 11, 2020) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 401, 404, 413, 414, 415,
417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437, 440, 450 & 460).
46 85 Fed. Reg. 79,823 (Dec. 11, 2020) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 61.8; 14 C.F.R. pt. 101 &
14 C.F.R. § 107.1 (2020)).
47 S.B. 3337 (Feb. 25, 2020).
48 S.B. 3866 (Jun. 2, 2020).
38
39
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C. Recent Cases
The Eleventh Circuit published an opinion that reveals a seemingly
unfair result when controlling precedent conflicts with statutory
construction. In LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc.,49 the court analyzed
whether and to what extent the Death on the High Seas Act50 (DOHSA)
applied to a wrongful death action in which the plaintiff alleged that a
private company failed to properly service and maintain the F-16 that
her husband was flying when it crashed into the Gulf of Mexico.51 The
court also evaluated whether the company, which “was operating under
a services contract with the [U.S.] Air Force, [was] shielded from liability
by the so-called ‘government contractor’ defense.”52
On the day of the crash, the plaintiff’s husband—a retired Air Force
Lieutenant Colonel employed as a civilian by the Department of
Defense—flew an Air Force F-16 fighter jet from Tyndall Air Force Base
in Florida over the Gulf of Mexico for a training exercise. The jet crashed
more than twelve miles offshore and plaintiff’s husband was killed. PAE
Worldwide, Inc. (PAE) was operating under a contract with the Air Force
to provide aircraft service and maintenance at Tyndall, including the F16 that plaintiff’s husband was flying when he crashed. In performing
under the contract, PAE was required to follow detailed guidelines and
adhere to specific standards prepared by or on behalf of the Air Force.53
Lt. Col. LaCourse’s widow filed a wrongful death action in Florida
state court alleging state law claims for negligence, breach of warranty,
and breach of contract.54 PAE removed the case to federal court based on
jurisdiction under DOHSA, which confers admiralty jurisdiction “[w]hen
the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
occurring on the high seas.”55 PAE then moved for partial summary
judgment, arguing that DOHSA, which limits a plaintiff’s recovery to
pecuniary loss, governed LaCourse’s suit.56
The district court granted PAE’s motion “and held that DOHSA
applie[d] and ‘[thus provided] the exclusive remedy for death on the high
seas, preemp[ting] all other forms of wrongful death claims, and only

980 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2020).
46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08.
51 980 F.3d at 1352.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1353.
54 Id. at 1354.
55 Id. (alteration in the original); 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2021).
56 980 F.3d at 1354.
49
50
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permit[ting] recovery for pecuniary damages.’”57 LaCourse argued that
the district court erred because the negligence asserted—PAE’s
maintenance of the F-16—did not occur on the high seas, as the Act’s
plain language requires. Rather, she said, the alleged negligence
occurred on land when the jet was improperly serviced at Tyndall Air
Force Base.58
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but begrudgingly so. In fact, the
opinion states that LaCourse was “exactly right” and the court would
agree with her if it had a clean slate upon which to rule, but controlling
precedent required a rejection of the statute’s plain-text argument.59
Relying on two cases interpreting DOHSA to confer jurisdiction over
claims arising out of airplane crashes on the high seas even if the alleged
negligence occurred on land,60 the court was constrained to agree with
the district court that DOHSA applied even though PAE’s alleged
negligence occurred on land at Tyndall Air Force Base.61
The court also had to determine whether DOHSA provided LaCourse’s
exclusive remedy, thereby preempting all other claims arising from the
crash. The court again stated that LaCourse had the plain language of
the statute on her side, but that controlling precedent was “squarely
against her” and thus DOHSA foreclosed her claims for breach of
warranty and breach of contract.62
The final issue for the court’s consideration was whether LaCourse’s
claim was barred by the so-called “government contractor” defense, a
creation of federal common law that allows contractors to escape liability
under the shield of the United States’ sovereign immunity when the
contractor was following the government’s orders.63 The court held that
while LaCourse did present evidence supporting her DOHSA-based
negligence claim, the only relevant question as to the “government
contractor” defense was whether PAE violated specific government
procedures. Because the evidence showed that it did not, PAE was
properly granted summary judgment on “government contractor”

Id.
Id. at 1355.
59 Id. at 1355–56.
60 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 218 (1986); In re Dearborn Marine
Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 1974).
61LaCourse, 980 F.3d at 1356.
62 Id. at 1358.
63 Id. at 1358–59.
57
58
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grounds.64 Joining the opinion, Judge Kevin Newsom delivered a
powerful concurrence65:
[W]hile I agree that we must follow existing precedent . . . I do so
holding my nose, as DOHSA’s plain language is squarely to the
contrary. LaCourse’s logic, it seems to me, is unassailable. Somehow,
though, precedent—mounds of it, some of it binding on us—has
whistled past the text’s unmistakable focus of the location of the
alleged negligence as the decisive factor for determining DOHSA’s
applicability. . . Bottom line: as in all cases, we should give effect to
DOHSA’s unambiguous language . . . If it were up to me, I would hold
that DOHSA doesn’t apply here because the alleged negligence—the
failure to properly maintain the F-16 that Lt. Col. LaCourse was
piloting when he crashed—occurred on land, not on the high seas.66

Judge Newsom’s frustration highlights the clash that occurs when
courts are bound to follow precedent that defies the plain language of a
statute.
In an unpublished opinion from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, a class of four customers sued Spirit
Airlines alleging breach of contract related to Spirit’s Shortcut Security
Program, which provides an expedited security process for purchase.67
The plaintiffs entered this program and claimed Spirit failed to provide
them with the service for which they paid.68
“An airline’s ‘[c]ontract of [c]arriage is a federally regulated contract
that governs the right of the parties.’”69 Contracts of carriage (COCs) are
controlled by the Federal Aviation Regulations,70 which permit airlines
to incorporate them into passengers’ reservations.71 Spirit’s COC governs
all the rights and remedies of its passengers, from the initial ticket
purchase to retrieving checked baggage, and everything in between,
including the Shortcut Security Program.72 Spirit’s COC contains an
explicit class action waiver stating that any lawsuit pursuant to the

Id. at 1358–62.
The concurrence was joined by Judge Charles R. Wilson.
66 Id. at 1362–64.
67 Roman, et al. v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 19-CIV-61461-RAR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2020).
68 Id. at *2.
69 Id. at *7 (alteration in original) (citing Pons v. Arubaanse Luchtvaart Maatschappij,
No. 17-cv-22008 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2018)).
70 Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 1.1-1310.20.
71 Roman, No. 19-CIV-61461-RAR at *8.
72 Id. at *2.
64
65
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contract must be brought in a passenger’s individual capacity and not as
a plaintiff in a class action.73
Spirit filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that any
breach it committed was limited to its COC and that plaintiffs’ claims
were precluded by the class action waiver because the complaint only
invoked federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.74
Finding that the plaintiffs’ claims were governed by Spirit’s COC, and
thus the plaintiffs were without their class allegations, the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ individual breach of
contract claims.75 Diversity jurisdiction did not exist, as all parties were
citizens of Florida and the amount that each plaintiff paid for the
Shortcut Security Program was $6.00, thus failing to meet the $75,000
minimum amount in controversy.76 Without subject matter jurisdiction,
plaintiffs’ individual claims were dismissed as a matter of law.77 The
plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on September 30, 2020. As of February
2021, the appeal is pending in the Eleventh Circuit.78
IV. RAILROADS
A. Regulation
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) was focused on safety
during this Survey period with the amendment of existing rules and the
codification of several new rules.
The first rule to become effective during this Survey period was the
Risk Reduction Program, which was proposed on February 18, 202079 and
became effective on April 20, 2020.80 The Risk Reduction Program (RRP)
imposes a requirement on all “Class I freight railroad and each freight
railroad with inadequate safety performance to develop and implement
a Risk Reduction Program (RRP) to improve the safety of its
operations.”81 The FRA defines an RRP as a comprehensive, systemoriented approach to improving safety by which an organization formally

Id. at *5
Id. at *2–3; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
75 Roman, No. 19-CIV-61461-RAR at *22.
76 Id. at *23; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
77 Roman, No. 19-CIV-61461-RAR at*23; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
78 Docket No. 20-13699.
79 Risk Reduction Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 9262 (Feb. 18, 2020) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R.
pt. 271).
80 Id.
81 Id.
73
74
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identifies and analyzes applicable hazards and takes action to mitigate,
if not eliminate, the risks associated with those hazards. It provides a
railroad with a set of decision-making processes and procedures that can
help it plan, organize, direct, and control its railroad operations in a way
that enhances safety and promotes compliance with regulatory
standards.82 The rule, first proposed in 2015, requires Class I railroads
to submit an RRP plan by August 16, 2021, which must include: “Riskbased hazard management program; safety performance evaluation;
safety
outreach;
technology
implementation
plan;
RRP
employee/contractor training; railroad employee involvement; and
internal assessment.”83 However, the requirements of the RRP are
purposefully broad to provide for flexibility, as the FRA acknowledges
that operating systems and budgets vary from railroad to railroad.84
Additionally, the FRA amended its regulations regarding safety
operations on commuter and intercity passenger rails.85 The System
Safety Program and Risk Reduction Program86 requires commuter and
intercity passenger rail (IPR) operations to develop and implement a
system safety program (SSP)87 to improve the safety of their operations.
This rule became effective May 4, 2020. While recognizing that each
passenger rail service involves multiple entities, the FRA stated that it
“expects each passenger rail operation to have a single SSP and written
SSP plan.”88 Further, the responsibility of developing, filing, and
implementing the SSP plan will fall on “the entity conducting the
railroad operations.”89 The rule requires that each passenger rail to
which the rule applies should submit its SSP plan to the FRA by March
4, 2021.90
The FRA also amended its Rail Integrity and Track Safety
Standards.91 On December 31, 2019, the FRA published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in which the FRA proposed to amend
subparts A, D, F, and G of the Track Safety Standards (TSS) to:
Id.
Id. at 9263.
84 Id. at n.1.
85 System Safety Program and Risk Reduction Program 85 Fed. Reg. 12,826 (March 4,
2020) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 270 and 271).
86 Id.
87 A System Safety Program plan is defined in 49 C.F.R. 270.103.
88 85 Fed. Reg. 12,826, 12,830.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Rail Integrity and Track Safety Standards, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,362 (Oct. 7, 2020) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 213).
82
83
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“(1) [a]llow for continuous rail testing, (2) incorporate longstanding
waivers related to track frogs,92 (3) remove the exception for highdensity commuter lines for certain track inspection method
requirements, and (4) incorporate several consensus-based, RSAC
[Railroad Safety Advisory Committee] recommendations.”93

After revisions, the final rule went into effect on October 7, 2020.94 The
FRA anticipates that the amendments will “benefit track owners,
railroads, and the public by reducing unnecessary costs and incentivizing
innovation, while improving rail safety.”95
Continuing with its emphasis on safety, the FRA revised 49 C.F.R.
Parts 218, 221, and 232 to clarify existing regulations governing braking
inspections, tests, and equipment.96 The revisions are the result of a
petition by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) “requesting
[the] FRA relax the requirement to conduct a Class I brake test prior to
operation if a train is off-air for a period of more than four hours by
extending the off-air period to twenty-four hours.”97 Following the
petition from the AAR, the FRA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
on January 15, 2020, in which the FRA “propos[ed] codification of
existing waivers related to brake systems, and making technical
amendments to reduce regulatory burdens while maintaining or
improving safety.”98 This rule became effective on December 11, 2020.99
Finally, on December 16, 2020, the Metrics and Minimum Standards
for Intercity Passenger Rail Service became effective.100 This rule
specifically pertains to Amtrak, and “establishes metrics and minimum
standards for measuring the performance and service quality of Amtrak’s
intercity passenger train operations.”101 This rule sets forth four
categories by which Amtrak is to be measured: “On-time performance
92 As explained by the FRA, “[a] frog is a track component used at the intersection of two
running rails to provide support for wheels and passage for their flanges, thus permitting
the wheels on either rail to cross the other intersecting rail.” 85 Fed. Reg. 63,362 at fn.1.
93 85 Fed. Reg. 63,362.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Miscellaneous Amendments to Brake System Safety Standards and Codification of
Waivers, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,544 (Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 218, 221, and
232).
97 Id.
98 Id.; 85 Fed. Reg. 2494 (Jan. 15, 2020).
99 85 Fed. Reg. 80,544.
100 Metrics and Minimum Standards for Intercity Passenger Rail Service, 85 Fed. Reg.
72,971 (Nov. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 273).
101 Id. at 72,972.
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(OTP) and train delays, customer service, financial, and public
benefits.”102 However, specific emphasis is placed on OTP and train
delays.103 The FRA anticipates that the rule may lower costs for Amtrak
“to the extent it results in improved OTP, which may reduce labor costs,
fuel costs, and expenses related to passenger inconvenience, and provide
benefits to riders from improved travel times and service quality.”104
B. Recent Cases
The United States District Courts within the Eleventh Circuit
addressed few notable cases pertaining to railroads during this Survey
period, but two decisions address whether a railroad may be held liable
under state law claims for nuisance.
In Reese v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,105 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia addressed whether the
presence of kudzu on a culvert located in the plaintiffs’ backyard that was
owned and operated by CSX Transportation (CSX) contributed to the
flooding of the plaintiffs’ homes after significant rain. The plaintiffs filed
suit against CSX alleging that it was liable for various state law claims,
including nuisance, negligence, negligence per se, and requesting
injunctive relief.106 The crux of the plaintiffs’ claims was that kudzu,
which covered the culvert, collected debris and caused the plaintiffs’
home to flood by preventing proper drainage.107 The court found that the
plaintiffs presented enough evidence to overcome the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ negligence claims but granted
summary judgment to the defendant as to all of plaintiffs’ remaining
claims.108 Specifically, the court found that the defendant had a duty to
maintain the culvert, and that the plaintiffs had presented enough
evidence to create an issue of material fact as to whether the defendant
was negligent in maintaining the culvert.109

Id.
Paragraph (a)(2) of 49 C.F.R. 273 “provides a minimum standard for customer ontime performance of 80 percent for any [two] consecutive calendar quarters.” 85 Fed. Reg.
at 72,988.
104 85 Fed. Reg. 72,971, 72,972.
105 2020 WL 5740253 (S.D. Ga. 2020).
106 Id. at *25.
107 Id. at *2.
108 Id. at *33.
109 Id. at *28. The court noted that the issues of material fact pertain to the issues of
breach and causation.
102
103
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On the other hand, in Bankhead v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,110
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
addressed whether the plaintiffs’ state law claims for nuisance, trespass,
negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy against the defendant were
preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of
1995 (ICCTA)111 thus necessitating dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint.
The plaintiffs’ claims arose as a result of the defendant storing
approximately 252 railcars within their neighborhood which contained
waste materials, including sewage, and omitted an obnoxious stench in
addition to causing an infestation of flies.112 Under the ICCTA, the
Surface Transportation Board has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims
arising from transportation of rail carriers.113 The defendant moved to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that the claims were preempted
under the ICCTA.114 The plaintiffs argued that because the defendant
was merely storing the railcars at the facility, the cars were not in
transport and thus not within the jurisdiction of the Surface
Transportation Board.115 However, the court cited to the definition of
“transportation” within the ICCTA which specifically includes “‘storage’
related to the movement of passengers and property.”116 Thus, the court
found that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by the ICCTA and
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.117
Turning away from nuisance but keeping to the issue of preemption,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
answered the question of whether an employee’s claim under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA)118 was precluded by the Federal
Railroad Safety Act (FRSA)119 in Guinn v. Norfolk Southern Railway
Co..120 In Guinn, the plaintiff was injured while working for the
defendant and filed suit, alleging claims for negligent training, negligent

2020 WL 4464443 (N.D. Ala. 2020).
49 U.S.C. §§ 701–727 (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301–1325 effective
December 18, 2015). The ICCTA abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission and
created the Surface Transportation Board that has authority over all rail carriers.
112 Bankhead, 2020 WL 4464443 at *1.
113 49 U.S.C. § 10501.
114 Bankhead, 2020 WL 4464443 at *2.
115 Id. at *3.
116 Id. at *4 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9)(B)).
117 Id.
118 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60.
119 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101–20121.
120 441 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
110
111
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assignment, and failure to abide by the Safety Appliance Act.121 The
defendant moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that because
its training program was approved pursuant to FRA regulations, the
plaintiff’s FELA claims “premised on an ordinary, ‘reasonable care’
standard” were precluded by the FRSA.122 The defendant relied on the
FRSA’s preemption prevision, which states, “[l]aws, regulations, and
orders related to railroad safety and laws, regulations, and orders related
to railroad security shall be nationally uniform to the extent
practicable.”123 The court, however, was not persuaded by the defendant’s
argument. Rather, the court relied on the reasoning set forth in the
Georgia Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
v. Hartry.124 In Hartry, the same defendant raised the very same
argument, which the supreme court rejected. The Georgia Supreme
Court held in Hartry that “[p]ermitting safety-related suits under FELA
will enhance, rather than impede, the purpose of FRSA in promoting
railroad safety and reducing accidents.”125 The District Court in Guinn
adopted the reasoning of the Georgia Supreme Court and held that
“FELA claims based on an ordinary ‘reasonableness standard’ are not
precluded by the FRSA.”126
V. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
While no formal rules regarding autonomous vehicles (AVs) were
promulgated in 2020, as innovation continues, the groundwork is being
laid for the enactment of legislation and regulations by federal entities.
In March 2020, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) entitled
“Occupant Protection for Automated Driving Systems.”127 This is one of
many regulatory actions that NHTSA is considering to address the
challenges of testing and verifying that vehicles equipped with
Automated Driving Systems (ADS) are in compliance with the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS).128
The proposed rule would modify the existing FMVSS to maintain the
current occupant protection requirements while also providing
Id. at 1322–23.
Id. at 1333.
123 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)).
124 307 Ga. 566, 837 S.E.2d 303 (2019).
125 Id. at 572, 837 S.E.2d at 309.
126 Guinn, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 1333–34.
127 85 Fed. Reg. 17,624 (Mar. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
128 Id. at 17,625; 49 C.F.R. pt. 571, Subpart B.
121
122
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regulatory certainty for manufacturers developing ADS-equipped
vehicles.129 NHTSA intends to achieve this goal by making changes to the
FMVSS and 49 C.F.R. § 571.3, which defines the terms contained in the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.130 The areas of
interest include occupant protection,131 driver impact protection,132
steering control displacement,133 seating systems,134 side impact and roof
protection,135 child restraint anchoring systems,136 and ejection
mitigation.137 While this proposal attempts to resolve most of the FMVSS
occupant protection barriers, it does not address warnings related to ADS
vehicles when there is no requirement for an occupant to be in the
driver’s seat, which will be the subject of its own future NPRM to engage
the stakeholders in discussion.138
In a hint of federal rulemaking on the horizon, NHTSA granted its
first AV exemption from the established safety standards.139 A
California-based company developing a robotic vehicle smaller than a
typical car was exempted from three FMVSSs regarding occupant safety
because its vehicle does not have any occupant compartments or manual
controls.140 NHTSA also released two Advanced Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRMs)141 and a 248-page report with findings from a
research project regarding technical translations of the FMVSS and their
application to ADS-equipped vehicles.142
Another publication during this Survey period came from the National
Science & Technology Council and U.S. Department of Transportation,
which issued a joint report developed to unify efforts related to AVs

85 Fed. Reg. at 17,626.
Id.; 80 Stat. 718 (1966).
131 49 C.F.R. § 571.201 (1997).
132 49 C.F.R. § 571.203 (2012).
133 49 C.F.R. § 571.204 (1998).
134 49 C.F.R. § 571.207 (2008).
135 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.214, 571.216(a) (2012).
136 49 C.F.R. § 571.225 (2012).
137 49 C.F.R. § 571.226 (2020).
138 85 Fed. Reg. at 17,626.
139 Nuro, Inc.; Grant of Temporary Exemption for a Low-Speed Vehicle With An
Automated Driving System, 85 Fed. Reg. 7,826 (Feb. 11, 2020).
140 49 C.F.R. § 571.500 (2016).
141 Framework for Automated Driving System Safety, 85 Fed. Reg. 78,058 (Dec. 3, 2020);
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Test Procedures, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,456 (Dec. 10,
2020).
142 FMVSS Considerations for Vehicles with Automated Driving Systems: Volume 1
(Report No. DOT HS 812 796, Apr. 2020).
129
130
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across thirty-eight federal departments and independent agencies.143 The
Congressional Research Service released “Issues in Autonomous Vehicle
Testing and Deployment,” noting that while Congress remains interested
in autonomous vehicles and is considering legislative solutions to some
of the regulatory challenges, no legislative proposals have become law.144
Vehicles operating on public roads are subject to dual regulation by
the federal government and states in which they are registered and
driven. Both federal and state agencies are addressing vehicle motorist
standards while AV innovation continues. The DOT has announced that
it anticipates issuing annual updates to its regulatory guidance. The
mainstream use of autonomous vehicles has tremendous implications for
highway infrastructure, which will require laws and regulations that we
can expect to see as the technology evolves.
VI. SHAREABLE DOCKLESS MOBILITY DEVICES
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
recently examined the duty that dockless electric scooter and bicycle
companies owe to the general public. In Robinson v. Bird Rides, Inc.,145
the plaintiff was riding his own bike in Atlanta around dusk when he ran
over one of the defendant’s scooters, which was lying abandoned in the
street. The scooter was painted black and was not equipped with
reflectors or lights. The plaintiff lost control of his bicycle, fell, and broke
his hip.146 The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant claiming that the
defendant “breached its duty of care by ‘failing to equip its products with
warnings lights or reflectors,’” by failing to prevent minors from handling
scooters and by failing to prevent individuals from leaving its scooters in
roadways.147
The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was granted.148 The
court’s interpretation of Georgia law found that the defendant owed the
plaintiff no legal duty and therefore the plaintiff’s negligence action
failed as a matter of law.149 The court’s reasoning goes to the nature of

143 Ensuring American Leadership in Automated Vehicle Technologies: Automated
Vehicles 4.0 (Jan. 2020); https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/policyinitiatives/automated-vehicles/360956/ensuringamericanleadershipav4.pdf.
144 Bill Canis, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45985, Issues in Autonomous Vehicle Testing and
Deployment (Feb. 11, 2020).
145 2020 WL 2129241, at *1 (N.D. Ga. May 5, 2020).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at *3.
149 Id. at *2.
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the shareable vehicle business model. Because the plaintiff’s complaint
alleged that an unknown third party, as opposed to the defendant
themselves, left the scooter in the plaintiff’s path, the defendant owed
him no duty.150 The defendant argued that it can place scooters around
the city as it pleases, fail to provide docking stations where customers
can return scooters after use, not include any lights or reflectors to make
scooters more visible when strewn about the roadway by carefree
customers, and avoid liability to the plaintiff because it owed him no
duty.151 The court found that Georgia law supported that argument and
granted the Motion to Dismiss.152
VII. CONCLUSION
As this Article illustrates, commercial-transportation law involves an
often-complex interaction of state and federal laws and reaches into wideranging areas of American life. Staying well informed about the laws and
regulations affecting commercial transportation is indispensable for
practitioners across legal practice areas.

150 Id.; See Shockley v. Zayre of Atlanta, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 672, 165 S.E.2d 179, 182
(1968) (finding that the defendant had no duty to protect the plaintiff from the foreseeable
and dangerous actions of third parties).
151 Robinson, 2020 WL 2129241, at *1.
152 Id. at *3.

